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Abstract
A person can experience an effect on the occurrence of an outcome in a defined follow-up period without experi-
encing an effect on the risk of that outcome over the same period. Sufficient causes are sometimes used to dee-
pen potential-outcome explanations of this phenomenon. In doing so, care should be taken to avoid tipping the
balance between simplification and realism too far toward simplification. Death and other competing risks should
not be assumed away. The time scale should be explicit, with specific times for the occurrence of specified com-
ponent causes and for the completion of each sufficient cause. Component causes that affect risk should occur no
later than the start of the risk period. Sufficient causes should be allowed to have component causes in common.
When individuals experience all components of two or more sufficient causes, the outcome must be recurrent.
In addition to effects on rates and risks, effects on incidence time itself should be considered.
Introduction
One hears much talk of epidemiology’s limits [1-5],
some real, some imagined. Gatto and Campbell [6]
explore one of the real ones. Following previous
attempts [7-9], they use Rothman’s sufficient cause
model [10] to explain how a person can experience a
causative effect on the occurrence of an outcome in a
defined follow-up period without experiencing an
increase in the risk of that outcome over the same
period.
Consider person GD3 in the authors’ hypothetical
example. She had the GSTm1 deletion and developed
liver cancer at the end of the fourth year of a 12-year
risk period. Had she lacked the deletion, she still would
have developed liver cancer, but not until the end of the
eighth year. The deletion therefore hastened her liver
cancer by 4 years, unarguably a causative effect. Never-
theless, as the entire 4-year shift in her incidence time
took place within the 12-year follow-up period, her 12-
year risk was not affected. Neither was her 2-year risk.
Her 6-year risk was increased, however.
Gatto and Campbell prefer to call a hastening of inci-
dence time unaccompanied by an increase in risk “cau-
sal redundancy.” The term is a fine one, except for its
f a i l u r et oc o n v e yt h ed e p e n d e n c eo ft h ep h e n o m e n o n
on an investigator’s arbitrary choice of when to define
the beginning and end of a risk period.
The basic idea, that an exposure contrast can hasten
or delay the occurrence of a health outcome and that
these causal effects may or may not be reflected as
effects on risk over arbitrarily defined follow-up periods,
is not very complicated. I usually find myself wondering
if it needs to be explained in terms any deeper than
those of potential outcomes. Many of us long for deeper
explanations, however. When we do, we often turn to
the model of sufficient causes.
In Gatto and Campbell’s example, person GD3 had
two potential liver cancer outcomes, one at the end of
year 4 and the other at the end of year 8. She had two
potential occurrences, each of which needs its own suffi-
cient cause to explain it. The sufficient cause with the
earlier completion time contained the GSTm1 deletion
as a component cause. The one with the later comple-
tion time did not. The latter sufficient cause was a way
of getting liver cancer to which the presence or absence
of the GSTm1 deletion was irrelevant.
The success of Gatto and Campbell’s example depends
in part on how realistically the details of the sufficient
causes and potential outcomes of person GD3 and the
other members of the hypothetical cohort are portrayed.
The example’s success depends as well on the degree to
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relief.
Assuming away a major competing risk
A remarkable feature of Gatto and Campbell’sh y p o t h e -
tical example is that a cohort of 200 adults is followed
for 12 years and no one dies. Death, of course, is a com-
peting risk for liver cancer. When Robins and Greenland
[11] developed the initial theory for the potential risk
model employed here, it became considerably more
complicated upon the introduction of competing risks.
The assumption of more than a decade of temporary
immortality in the present example is thus highly sim-
plifying, but at the expense of working at cross purposes
to the laudable goal of making the example realistic.
Sufficient causes and risk
A sufficient cause is a list of conditions and events
necessary for a given occurrence of a given outcome
[10]. The items on the list are the component causes of
which the sufficient cause is composed. A great plus of
Gatto and Campbell’s example is that the time scale, the
occurrence time of each specified component cause and
the completion time of each sufficient cause are all
made explicit.
In the version of the sufficient cause model Gatto and
Campbell employ, the occurrence of the final compo-
nent cause is equivalent to the occurrence of the out-
come [12-14]. The final component has an induction
time of zero. When it acts, the outcome instantanously
occurs. The outcome may not be instantaneously recog-
nized, however. The latent period, or “t h et i m ei tt a k e s
for the disease to become manifest” [10], is defined in
this version of the model as the time between the occur-
rence of the outcome and its recognition by signs and
symptoms.
This conceptualization differs from one in which the
completion of a sufficient cause means not that the dis-
ease occurs, but only that “the disease process is set in
motion” [10]. In this version of the model [9], time may
elapse between sufficient cause completion and outcome
occurrence. Here, the time it takes for a disease to
“become manifest” [10] is not (or is not merely) the
time between occurrence and recognition. This period
includes (or is) the time it takes for the disease process
that was set into motion by the completion of a suffi-
cient cause to unfold and culminate, ultimately, in an
occurrence of the disease.
When we specify a small number of components in a
sufficient cause, we leave all the others unspecified.
Some of the unspecified components may be known.
The others are unknown. As a group, they form the
“causal complement” [10] of the specified components.
A short-hand notation is usually used for the causal
complement in each sufficient cause. In Gatto and
Campbell’s example, there are two sufficient causes of
liver cancer. One, with a causal complement labeled U1,
has the GSTm1 deletion and “aflatoxin acquisition” as
the specified components. The other, with hepatitis C
infection and “alcohol acquisition” as the specified
components, has a causal complement labeled U2.
In studying effects on the risk of an outcome over a
defined follow-up period, we properly relate the risk to
each person’s exposure history and status up to the start
of that period (i.e., at baseline), but not beyond. In
Gatto and Campbell’s example, each cohort member’s
status with regard to the GSTm1 deletion was estab-
lished long before baseline. The other specified compo-
nent causes (hepatitis C infection and alcohol and
aflatoxin “acquisition”), in contrast, take place years
downstream of baseline. As it would not be possible to
study the effects of these post-baseline exposures on the
risk of liver cancer over the defined 12-year risk period,
Gatto and Campbell make no attempt to do so.
Given that alcohol and aflatoxin “acquisition” are the
final components of every sufficient cause in which they
take part, we might imagine what it would take to study
their effects on risk over any follow-up period. To study
the aflatoxin effect, for instance, we could not be able to
start each exposed person’s risk period until she meets
the operational definition of “acquiring” that exposure.
Because this component cause is always the last one to
complete a sufficient cause, its induction time is always
zero in this version of the sufficient cause model.
Hence, for every incident liver cancer the final compo-
nent causes would occur at the very instant the follow-
up period begins. As Gatto and Campbell assume
uniformly zero latent periods in this version of the
model, the disease would be instantly recognized as well.
The example could be modified to permit the study of
the effects of alcohol and aflatoxin on risk by giving these
component causes induction periods longer than zero.
One then could roll back their “acquisition” to each per-
son’s status or history at the start of the 12-year follow-
up period (i.e., at baseline). The last component cause to
complete each sufficient cause could then be made an
element of one of the causal complements, U1 or U2.
Ubiquitous, uncorrelated causal complements
Gatto and Campbell follow Rothman and Greenland
[13] and Rothman et al. [14] in constructing hypotheti-
cal examples in which all the causal complements are
ubiquitous. In the present example, each person in the
population is said to possess every single element of U1
and U2. The lack of realism in such assumptions has
been acknowledged [14].
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assuming that U1 and U2 share no component causes in
common. It is not clear why this additional assumption
was imposed. It would be unrealistic in many settings.
Even when etiologic mechanisms for a given outcome
differ in crucial respects, they often have at least some
component causes in common. Some of the commonal-
ities, such as the presence of tonsils for tonsillitis, are so
obvious as to seem trivial. Trivial or not, they tend to
create a positive “correlatedness of susceptibilities” [15]
to the different sufficient causes. It would have done no
harm that I can discern to have allowed U1 and U2 to
s h a r es o m ee l e m e n t si nc o m m o ni nt h ep r e s e n t
example.
When an outcome is a competing risk for itself
Although Gatto and Campbell removed the major com-
peting risk for liver cancer from their example by not
letting anyone die in the 12-year follow-up period, they
did allow one competing risk to remain. Following pre-
vious authors, they treated the outcome as a competing
risk for its own subsequent occurrence (i.e., as a “non-
recurrent event”) [13,14].
For recurrent outcomes such as diarrhea or myocar-
dial infarction, it is relatively straightforward to depict a
person who acquires every component of two or more
sufficient causes. Had liver cancer been treated as such
an outcome in the present example, person GD3 would
have developed the disease twice: once at the end of
year 4 when the sufficient cause involving aflatoxin, the
GSTm1 deletion and U1 was completed and again at the
end of year 8 upon completion of the sufficient cause
involving alcohol, hepatitis C and U2.
Instead, Gatto and Campbell treated liver cancer as a
non-recurrent event and, therefore, as a competing risk
for itself. In this way, it was more akin to death or
chicken pox than to diarrhea or myocardial infarction.
This decision created a quandary. Supposedly, all of
the following were the case for person GD3: She had
the GSTm1 deletion at the start of the risk period. Pos-
sessing every element of U1 as well, she developed liver
cancer at the end of year 4 when she “acquired afla-
toxin.” Meanwhile, she had become infected with hepati-
tis C at the end of year 2. After her first liver cancer,
and in possession of every element of U2,s h ew e n to n
to drink enough alcohol over the next 4 years to
“acquire” the final component of a second sufficient
cause. But she did not develop a second liver cancer at
that time. Somehow, she experienced every single com-
ponent of a sufficient cause of an outcome (an incident
liver cancer at the end of year 8) without experiencing
that outcome. This cannot be.
From the fact that person GD3 experienced liver can-
cer at the end of year 4, she must have experienced
every element of U1 in addition to having the GSTm1
deletion and “acquiring” aflatoxin. From the fact that
she did not experience a second liver cancer at the end
of year 8, despite developing a hepatitis C infection and
“acquiring alcohol,” I believe we must conclude that she
did not experience every element of U2.T h u s ,a l lt h e
elements of U2 were not ubiquitous after all. In fact,
given the portrayal of liver cancer in this example as a
competing risk for itself, it would seem that at least one
element of U2 must have been the negation of (or the
well-specified alternative to) at least one element of U1.
The example is similar in this regard to an example
constructed by Rothman et al. [14] with three sufficient
causes. One contained A = 0, B = 1 and U1. The second
contained A = 0, E = 1 and U2. The third contained B =
1, E = 1 and U3. The three causal complements (U1,U 2
and U3) were said to be ubiquitous. Each individual with
the exposure pattern A = 0, B = 1, E = 1 should have
experienced the outcome 3 times, once for each of the
completed sufficient causes she experienced. But the
outcome was said to be non-recurrent, so each of these
individuals experienced the outcome only once. Hence,
the example contained the same logical contradiction as
in Gatto and Campbell’s example: ostensibly completed
sufficient causes that do not culminate in occurrences of
the outcome.
I would suggest that it is not possible under the terms
of this version of the sufficient cause model for an indi-
vidual to experience all the specified components of 2
or more sufficient causes with different completion
times, for the causal complements of those sufficient
causes to be ubiquitous, and for the outcome to be non-
recurrent. If a person experiences all the specified and
unspecified components of 2 or more sufficient causes
with different completion times, that person must
experience the outcome more than once. If a person
experiences all the specified components of 2 or more
sufficient causes and the outcome is non-recurrent, each
causal complement must contain at least one compo-
nent that is the negation of (or the well-specified alter-
native to) a component of each of the other sufficient
causes and, therefore, the causal complements cannot
be ubiquitous.
Rates and risks are not the only options
Students and other collaborators sometimes tell me they
do not want to study risk. Instead, they want to study
time to event. I congratulate them and ask how we are
going to go about that task. The usual answer is that we
are going to fit a proportional hazards model. When I
ask what that analysis will tell us about time to event,
my collaborators seem befuddled. So I ask why we are
going to fit a proportional hazards model. The answer
tends to be something like this: “Because it will give us
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make me wonder how strong the initial commitment to
studying time to event really was.
Gatto and Campbell consider an analysis of incidence
rates, but not an analysis of incidence times [16]. In
their hypothetically perfect study of temporarily immor-
tal persons, the causal effect of the GSTm1 deletion in
the 100 members of the study population who had that
deletion (i.e., in the authors’ chosen target population)
was to reduce the liver cancer-free survival time from
1,187 to 1,167 person-years at risk. Averaged over the
entire target population, the total reduction of 20 years
would amount to a reduction of 0.2 years, or 2.4 months
per person.
If by “the full etiologic effect” the authors mean the
number of individuals in the target population who had
their liver cancer experience causally affected in any way
over the 12-year follow-up period, I suspect they would
be just as disappointed with this analysis as they were
with the analyses of risks and rates. No epidemiologic
data analysis would be capable of showing the number
of individuals affected, even in this hypothetically perfect
study with the highly simplifying assumptions of no
competing risk from death and no ability of the GSTm1
deletion to prevent or delay any occurrence of liver can-
cer. It could have been that all 5 cases had their inci-
dence times hastened by an average of 4 years. Or the
effect could have been experienced by 4 of the 5 cases,
for an average reduction of 5 years. Or the entire causa-
tive effect on liver cancer-free survival time could have
been confined to the three excess cases, for an average
of reduction of 6.7 years.
The first of these scenarios was the correct one, but
we know that only because we know each person’s
potential incidence times. If we knew such things in real
life, we would not need to do epidemiologic research.
Conclusion
On the first page of the first epidemiology textbook [17],
Greenwood wrote:
The physician’s unit of study is a single human
being, the epidemiologist’su n i ti sn o tas i n g l e
human being but an aggregate of human beings, and
since it is impossible to hold in the mind distinctly a
mass of separate particulars he forms a general pic-
ture, an average of what is happening, and works
upon that.
B e c a u s ew ew o r kw i t ha v e r a g e s ,w ew i l la l m o s tn e v e r
know, without very strong assumptions, how many indi-
viduals are affected by the conditions and events we
study. The mass of separate particulars of individual
effects cannot be held distinctly in our minds, or in our
methods.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Sander Greenland and Tyler J. VanderWeele for
considered advice.
Received: 20 March 2010 Accepted: 24 August 2010
Published: 24 August 2010
References
1. Wing S: Limits of epidemiology. Med Global Surv 1994, 1:74-86.
2. Taubes G: Epidemiology faces its limits. Science 1995, 269:164-169.
3. Bunton R, Russell J: The limits to epidemiology revisited. Crit Public Health
1997, 7:2-6.
4. Doll R: The limits of epidemiology. J Radiol Prot 1999, 19:1-2.
5. Terracini B: The limits of epidemiology and the Spanish toxic oil
syndrome. Int J Epidemiol 2004, 33:443-444.
6. Gatto N, Campbell UB: Redundant causation from a sufficient cause
perspective. Epidemiol Perspect Innovat 2010, 7:5.
7. Greenland S, Poole C: Invariants and noninvariants in the concept of
interdependent effects. Scand J Work Environ Health 1988, 14:125-129.
8. Darroch J: Biologic synergism and parallelism. Am J Epidemiol 1997,
145:661-668.
9. VanderWeele TJ, Robins JM: Empirical and counterfactual conditions for
sufficient cause interactions. Biometrika 2008, 95:49-61.
10. Rothman KJ: Causes. Am J Epidemiol 1976, 104:587-592.
11. Robins JM, Greenland S: Estimability and estimation of expected years of
life lost due to a hazardous exposure. Statist Med 1991, 10:79-93.
12. Rothman KJ: Induction and latent periods. Am J Epidemiol 1981,
114:253-259.
13. Rothman KJ, Greenland S: Causation and causal inference. In Modern
epidemiology. Edited by: Rothman KJ, Greenland S. Lippincott-Raven; ,
Second 1998:9-11.
14. Rothman KJ, Greenland S, Poole C, Lash TL: Causation and causal
inference. In Modern epidemiology. Edited by: Rothman KJ, Greenland S,
Lash TL. Lippincott Williams and Wilkins; Third 2008:6-13.
15. Miettinen OS: Causal and preventive interdependence: elementary
principles. Scand J Work Environ Health 1982, 8:159-168.
16. Boshuizen H, Greenland S: Average age at first occurrence as an
alternative occurrence parameter in epidemiology. Int J Epidemiol 1997,
26:867-872.
17. Greenwood M: Epidemics and crowd-diseases: an introduction to the
study of epidemiology. New York: The MacMillan Company 1935, 1.
doi:10.1186/1742-5573-7-6
Cite this article as: Poole: How many are affected? A real limit of
epidemiology. Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2010 7:6.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Poole Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2010, 7:6
http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/7/1/6
Page 4 of 4